Crim195-2

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============================= Docket Number: Crim195-2 - Rex v. Fedwin

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============================= Brief for the King, submitted by Niven

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============================= The King's Brief for the prosecution of Fedwin for the crime of Murder of Ardor.

The facts of this case are not disputed. On the 9th of Dawn, 195 the mage Ardor entered a section of the town of Kelnore and attacked a villager that was already being attacked by the Cleric Fedwin. Fedwin states in his testimony that he was angered because "[Ardor] finished off prey that I worked hard for." Furthermore Fedwin claims "[Ardor] laughed after killing it, so I took insulting me as an insult to my god, and struck him down."

While Ardor refused a request to be interviewed by me, he did send a letter to me several days later that states "Fedwin killed me." I only include this to show that there is no disagreement about the murder from either side. Since the facts are not in dispute, the question before the court is to decide if Fedwin had the right to slay Ardor. There are two precedents we must examine to gain insight into this question. The first is Rex v. Bandle which established a citizen's right to kill another when an insult to honor had occurred. Fedwin noted in his testimony that he struck down Ardor because he took Ardor's actions to be an insult to himself and his God. Furthermore he explicitly said that he "consider[ed] it a matter of honor." It seems clear the Fedwin is claiming protection from legal retribution through the precedent established in Rex v. Bandle.

Rex v. Bandle provided the citizens of Sable with the right to avenge their honor through the use of violence. It did not give the citizens of Sable the right to murder others in the streets at the drop of a hat. Furthermore, Rex v. Bandle did not give the citizens the right to jump to conclusions and insinuate that actions were true insults to honor. Fedwin's claim that Ardor's "laughing" constituted an insult to his honor so serious that Ardor's death was the only appeasement is ludicrous. The prosecution strongly feels that even if Ardor had tried to insult Fedwin by laughing at him this would not be grounds for killing Ardor. The prosecution notes, however, that Fedwin can not even prove that is the case here, and therefore the question of the degree to which Fedwin's honor was insult is a moot one. Since the question of honor had been determined moot, the prosecution sought a precedent on the issue of kill stealing since it appears to be the source of this incident. The only precedent on file was Rex v. Delenn. In that case the "[Court found] that it is not a crime for an individual to interfere with and take credit for a kill already begun by another." So clearly Ardor committed no crime by stealing Fedwin's kill, but Rex v. Delenn went on to say that "There is no decision made as to whether the last minute taking of a kill started by another creates in the harmed individual a right of retaliation."

At the time Rex v. Delenn was decided, the Court chose not to examine an issue that was not before it. The prosecution feels that issue is now before the Court. Fedwin has claimed "the right of retaliation" that Rex v. Delenn did not decide upon.

The prosecution respectfully argues that no right of retaliation exists for Fedwin. In Rex v. Bandle the Court chose to set aside a very narrow band of situations in which there did exist a right of retaliation to avenge honor. At least these situations usually stem from the offender committing something that is a crime (like striking someone). The Court must see the danger in extending this narrow band of situations. If kill stealing, which is not a crime (Rex v. Delenn), is a situation that gives one a right of retaliation then why not other situations that are not crimes.

Perhaps I was standing in the Green Griffin counting my money to buy a sirloin when someone else walked in and bought the last sirloin. Clearly this would not be a crime. I had not bought the sirloin yet, so taking it was not stealing from me. Likewise, there was no crime in the person simply purchasing the sirlion. But I would then not be able to buy a sirlion and would perhaps feel robbed. Something that was of value to me was taken away before my very eyes. Doesn't it sound a little silly that this incident would give me the right to hunt that person down and slay them(even if they decided to snicker at me about getting the last sirloin)? But, if Fedwin has his right of retaliation to avenge kill stealing and a "laugh" then why couldn't I have that same right to avenge preemptive sirloin purchasing. Both cases would be a situation where something of value was snatched away before our eyes, although we did not yet own it. (Rex v. Delenn clearly stated that the kill does not belong to someone until it has actually happened (until the monster has died)). In my mind both cases are equally an abuse of legal "right of retaliation."

Sable is already a dangerous place. The last thing that is needed is for those with evil intent to have even more trumped-up excuses to kill others without threat of retaliation from the law. I urge the Court to not release a potential terror upon the populace. Send a message to the citizens of Sable that that narrow band of situations in which killing is a justified right of retaliation has not widened. The streets will be much safer when those that wish to do evil do not have a legal excuse to do so.

Respectfully,

Pvt. Niven, Justicar of Bilanx

(Principle Investigator and Prosecutor for Rex v. Fedwin)

No brief on record.

No judgment on record.